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CIVIL RIGHTS—MORBID OBESITY AS A DISABILITY 
UNDER THE ADA 
Morriss v. BNSF Ry. Co., 817 F.3d 1104 (8th Cir. 2016) 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In Morriss v. BNSF Ry. Co., the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit held an employer may refuse to hire a morbidly obese individual 
because of his weight, and not run afoul of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA)—as long as the individual’s obesity does not have a 
physiological cause and as long as the employer does not perceive the 
individual as suffering from a current physical impairment.  In addition, the 
court held that an employer could not be held liable under the “regarded-as” 
prong of the ADA if it denies employment to a morbidly obese individual 
based solely on fear that the individual will develop a physical disability in 
the future.  The court’s holding in Morriss will make it difficult for 
morbidly obese individuals to bring a claim for employment discrimination 
under the ADA, while providing employers practical tips on how to avoid 
liability with employment policies and practices.   
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I.  FACTS 
In March 2011, Melvin Morriss applied for and was granted a 
conditional offer of employment for a machinist position with BNSF.1  
According to BNSF policy for positions declared “safety sensitive,” 
Morriss’ offer was contingent upon a satisfactory medical review.2  Morriss 
completed the company’s medical questionnaire, stating he was five feet, 
ten inches tall, and he weighed two hundred and seventy pounds.3  He also 
stated that while he had once been diagnosed as pre-diabetic, he did not 
currently suffer from diabetes, he had no other health concerns, he 
experienced no difficulties or limitations in his daily activities, and his 
 
1.  Morriss v. BNSF, 817 F.3d 1104, 1106 (8th Cir. 2016). 
2.  Id. 
3.  Id. 
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overall health was good.4  Morriss’ doctor submitted treatment records in 
response to BNSF’s follow-up on his possible history of diabetes, and those 
records did not reflect a current diagnosis, or any symptoms of the disease.5 
Morriss underwent two separate physical examinations with BNSF 
doctors in May 2011.6  At the first, Morriss weighed 285 pounds and had a 
Body Mass Index (“BMI”)7 of 40.9.8  At the second, he weighed 281 
pounds and had a BMI of 40.4.9  Pursuant to the aforementioned policy, 
which denied employment in safety-sensitive positions to individuals with a 
BMI greater than 40, BNSF terminated Morriss’ conditional offer of 
employment.10  In an email, the company told Morriss he was “‘[n]ot 
currently qualified . . . due to significant health and safety risks associated 
with Class 3 obesity11 ([BMI] of 40 or greater).’”12 
Subsequently, Morriss filed a complaint against BNSF in January 
2013, claiming BNSF had discriminated against him based on his obesity in 
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),13 which makes it 
unlawful for a covered employer to discriminate against any qualified 
individual on the basis of disability.14  Morriss’ complaint asserted two 
causes of action under the ADA:15 first, he argued BNSF discriminated 
against him due to an actual disability, morbid obesity, under 42 U.S.C. § 
12102(1)(A) (“actual disability” prong); and second, he argued BNSF 
discriminated against him when it regarded him as having a disability which 
 
4.  Id. 
5.  Id. 
6.  Id. 
7.  Body Mass Index (BMI) is a measure of body fat calculated by dividing a person’s weight 
in kilograms by the square of his height in meters.  Body Mass Index (BMI), CENTERS FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (May 15, 2015), https://www.cdc.gov/healthyweight/ 
assessing/bmi/. 
8.  Morriss, 817 F.3d at 1106. 
9.  Id. 
10.  Id. 
11.  The medical establishment classifies obesity based on BMI.  Each successive class is 
associated with increased disease risk.  Individuals with a BMI between 30.0 and 34.9 fall within 
Class I; 35.0 to 39.9, Class II; and 40.0 and above, Class III, also known as morbid obesity.  
Classification of Overweight and Obesity by BMI, Waist Circumference, and Associated Disease 
Risk, NATIONAL HEART, LUNG, AND BLOOD INSTITUTE, http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/ 
educational/lose_wt/BMI/bmi_dis.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2016). 
12.  Morriss, 817 F.3d at 1106. 
13.  Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12103 (1990). 
14.  Id. 
15.  Morriss also sued under the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act (NFEPA), NEB. 
REV. STAT. §§ 48-1101 to -1126 (2016).  “Because disability-discrimination claims under the 
NFEPA are analyzed under the same framework as claims brought under the ADA, we need not 
conduct a separate analysis of Morriss’s state-law claims.”  Morriss, 817 F.3d at 1106 n.2 (citation 
omitted). 
         
144 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92: 141 
he did not have, under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C) (“regarded-as” prong).16  
BNSF moved for summary judgment, arguing that Morriss’ obesity did not 
meet the definition of disability under the ADA, and that the company did 
not regard his obesity as a disability.17  Morriss moved for partial summary 
judgment on the regarded-as claim.18 
The Nebraska district court found that Morriss had failed to provide 
any evidence to support his claim that his obesity was an actual disability 
under the ADA.19  Specifically, the district court found that Morriss’ claim 
failed because he did not prove that his obesity was a physical impairment, 
a necessary component of a disability under the ADA.20  The court also 
rejected Morriss’ regarded-as claim because it found no evidence that 
BNSF regarded Morriss as having a current disability.21  “[T]herefore [the 
district court] granted BNSF’s motion for summary judgment, denied 
Morriss’ motion for partial summary judgment, and dismissed the action 
with prejudice.”22  Morriss appealed only his regarded-as claim to the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.23 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Individuals with disabilities have faced serious and pervasive 
discrimination throughout American history; they have been denied 
equality in critical areas of life, including education, access to public 
services and accommodations, and employment.24  Nonetheless, individuals 
with disabilities traditionally lacked legal recourse.25  The ADA was passed 
in 1990 “to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the 
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce” in 
order to remedy this widespread discrimination.26 
 
16.  Morris, 817 F.3d at 1106-07. 
17.  Id. 
18.  Id. 
19.  Id. 
20.  Id. 
21.  Id. at 1107. 
22.  Morriss, 817 F.3d at 1107. 
23.  Id. at 1107-08. 
24.  42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2016). 
25.  Id. 
26.  Id. § 12101(b). 
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A. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA) AND ITS  
 IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS 
One goal of the ADA is “to provide a clear and comprehensive national 
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities.”27  Title I of the ADA bars discrimination in employment.28  An 
individual has a disability under the ADA if he or she has: “(A) a physical 
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 
activities . . . ; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) [been] regarded as 
having such an impairment.”29 
Central to the disability test is the concept of “impairment.”30  The 
ADA does not define impairment, but the term is defined in the regulations 
promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”), the agency Congress charged with implementing the ADA.31  A 
physical or mental impairment includes “[a]ny physiological32 disorder or 
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more 
body systems, such as neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, 
respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, 
digestive, genitourinary, immune, circulatory, hemic, lymphatic, skin, and 
endocrine.”33  The ADA’s implementing regulations are accompanied by 
interpretive guidance, also promulgated by the EEOC.34  The interpretive 
guidance attempts to elucidate the concept of physical impairment by 
ascertaining conditions and characteristics that are not impairments.35  
Specifically, the interpretive guidance states: 
It is important to distinguish between conditions that are 
impairments and physical, psychological, environmental, cultural, 
and economic characteristics that are not impairments.  The 
definition of the term “impairment” does not include physical 
characteristics such as eye color, hair color, left-handedness, or 
height, weight, or muscle tone that are within “normal” range and 
 
27.  Id. 
28.  Id. § 12112(a). 
29.  Id. § 12102(1). 
30.  42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2016). 
31.  See id. § 12205a (effective Jan. 1, 2009). 
32.  Physiological means “of or relating to physiology,” which is “a branch of biology that 
deals with the functions and activities of life or of living matter (as organs, tissues, or cells) and of 
the physical and chemical phenomena involved.” Physiology, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (Aug. 17, 
2016), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/physiology. 
33.  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (effective Apr. 4, 2012). 
34.  Interpretive Guidance on Title 1 of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 
1630 app. (2016). 
35.  Id. § 1630.2(h). 
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are not the result of a physiological disorder.  Other conditions, 
such as pregnancy, that are not the result of a physiological 
disorder are also not impairments.36 
B. THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT (ADAAA) 
In 2008 Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act (“ADAAA”) “[t]o 
restore the intent and protections of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act. . .”37 in response to actions by the Supreme Court that severely 
narrowed the ADA’s intended scope.38  Congress was particularly 
concerned with the Supreme Court’s restrictive reading of “disability,” 
which required a person be limited to a more significant degree than 
Congress had intended with the requirement that an individual be 
“substantially limit[ed]” by his or her disability.39  Accordingly, the 
ADAAA instructs courts to construe the term disability in favor of broad 
coverage of individuals, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of 
the ADA.40  The ADAAA, however, did not change the definition of the 
term “impairment.” 
C.  WEIGHT-BASED DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 
Discrimination against obese individuals is widespread, including in 
the employment context.41  Despite this, the federal government, and all but 
a few states and municipalities, provides no legal protection against 
discrimination based on weight.42  Obese individuals who experience 
discrimination in employment may bring a cause of action under the ADA 
on the theory that they have been disabled by their obesity, or that their 
employer perceives their obesity to be disabling, but the results of such 
lawsuits have been mixed.43  The success of these cases has depended on 
 
36.  Id. 
37.  ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553. 
38.  Id. 
39.  Id. at 3555. 
40.  Id. 
41.  See, e.g., Jane Korn, Too Fat, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 209, 224 (2010); Kari Horner, 
A Growing Problem: Why the Federal Government Needs to Shoulder the Burden in Protecting 
Workers from Weight Discrimination, 54 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 589 (2005); Camille A. Monahan, 
et al., Establishing a Physical Impairment of Weight Under the ADA/ADAAA: Problems of Bias in 
the Legal System, 29 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 537, 542 (2014). 
42.  Horner, supra note 41, at 603-05 (discussing laws prohibiting weight discrimination in 
Michigan, the District of Columbia, and San Francisco and Santa Cruz, California). 
43.  See Molly Henry, Do I Look Fat? Perceiving Obesity as a Disability Under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1761, 1774-86 (2007) (analyzing the results of 
cases brought under state and federal law and concluding the jurisprudence is “confusing and 
sometimes contradictory”). 
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whether the obese individual could prove his or her obesity was an 
impairment—which has been widely interpreted under the ADA to require 
the obesity have a physiological cause.44  Notably, courts examine the 
physiological cause issue on a case-by-case basis, not as a matter of law.45  
In other words, each individual plaintiff has the burden of proving that his 
or her obesity has a physiological cause, such as metabolic or thyroid 
disorder, rather than more stereotypical causes like overeating and lack of 
physical activity.46  Congress and the Supreme Court have yet to address 
the issue of whether obesity is, or can be, an impairment under the ADA.47 
III.   ANALYSIS 
In Morriss, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that “for obesity, 
even morbid obesity, to be considered a physical impairment [under the 
ADA] it must result from an underlying physiological disorder or 
condition.”48  Because Morriss failed to produce evidence that his obesity 
was the result of an underlying physiological disorder or condition, the 
Eighth Circuit upheld the district court’s finding that Morriss did not have a 
physical impairment.49  The court based its decision on the plain language 
of the statute and its interpretive guidance, prior case law, and the fact that 
the ADAAA did not change the definition of impairment.50  The Eighth 
Circuit also affirmed the district court’s decision that BNSF did not 
discriminate against Morriss on the basis of a perceived disability (i.e., 
Morriss’ regarded-as claim) because Morriss did not produce evidence that 
BNSF “perceived his obesity to be an existing physical impairment.”51  
 
44.  See, e.g., EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F.3d 436, 443 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that 
“to constitute an ADA impairment, a person’s obesity, even morbid obesity, must be the result of 
a physiological condition”); Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 287 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding 
that “physical characteristics that are ‘not the result of a physiological disorder’ are not considered 
‘impairments’ for the purposes of determining either actual or perceived disability”) (citation 
omitted). 
45.  See generally Henry, supra note 43. 
46.  See Korn, supra note 41, at 222.  See also Monahan, et al., supra note 41, at 538-39 
(arguing that physiological cause is an “extralegal” element that requires an obese individual 
prove he is not “culpable in [his] own disability [in order] to be entitled to the ADA’s protections, 
unlike all other ADA plaintiffs.”). For example, lung cancer qualifies as an impairment even if 
caused by smoking; same result for a paraplegic whose condition was the result of a drunk driving 
accident.  See id. 
47.  Henry, supra note 43, at 1763-64. 
48.  Morriss v. BNSF, 817 F.3d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 2016). 
49.  Id. at 1113. 
50.  Id. at 1107-12. 
51.  Id. 
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Again, the Eighth Circuit relied on the “plain language of the ADA” and its 
interpretive guidance in making its decision.52 
A.  THE DEFINITION OF PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT REQUIRES A  
 PHYSIOLOGICAL CAUSE 
First, the court examined the language of the ADA, the EEOC 
implementing regulations, and the interpretive guidance.53  The court 
considered the plain language of the implementing regulations, defining 
impairment as “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic 
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems . . .” 
and to clearly lay out two requirements for obesity as a physical 
impairment: (1) it must be a physiological disorder or condition, and (2) it 
must affect a major body system.54  In coming to this conclusion, the court 
rejected Morriss’ argument that an individual’s obesity need only be the 
result of a physiological disorder if his weight was within “normal range.”55  
Morriss read the ADA statute in light of EEOC interpretive guidance 
stating, “[t]he definition of the term ‘impairment’ does not include physical 
characteristics such as . . . weight . . . that are within ‘normal’ range and 
are not the result of a physiological disorder.”56  According to Morriss,57 
this use of the conjunctive “and” meant weight was an unprotected 
“physical characteristic” only when (1) it was within normal range and (2) it 
was not caused by a physiological disorder.58  The court considered its 
reading of the interpretive guidance “more natural,” particularly in light of 
additional language in the interpretive guidance providing that “[o]ther 
conditions, such as pregnancy, that are not the result of a physiological 
disorder are also not impairments.”59 
 
52.  Id. at 1113. 
53.  Id. at 1107-08. 
54.  Morriss, 817 F.3d at 1108. 
55.  Id. 
56.  Id. 
57.  Some courts have agreed with Morriss.  See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Feit, 365 Mont. 359, 367 
(2012) (holding that “[o]besity that is not the symptom of a physiological disorder or condition 
may constitute a ‘physical or mental impairment’ within the meaning of [Montana law modeled 
on the ADA] if the individual’s weight is outside ‘normal range’ and affects ‘one or more body 
systems’ as defined in [EEOC interpretive guidance].”); see also EEOC v. Res. for Human Dev., 
Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 688, 694 (E.D. La. 2011) (concluding that “[a] careful reading of the EEOC 
guidelines and the ADA reveals that the requirement for a physiological cause is only required 
when a charging party’s weight is within normal range.  However . . . if the charging party is 
severely obese . . . there is no explicit requirement that obesity be based on a physiological 
impairment.”). 
58.  Brief for Appellant at 29, Morriss v. BNSF Ry. Co., 817 F.3d 1104 (8th Cir. 2016) (No. 
14-3858), 2015 WL 1407182, at *29. 
59.  Morriss, 817 F.3d at 1108-09. 
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Despite some support for Morriss’ interpretation,60 the court relied on 
federal circuit court of appeals case law supporting its position.61  The Sixth 
Circuit, in EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc.,62 and the Second Circuit, in 
Francis v. City of Meriden,63 both held that in order to be an impairment, 
obesity, even morbid obesity, must have a physiological cause.64  The 
majority of district courts have reached the same conclusion.65 
B.  THE ADAAA DID NOT CHANGE THE PHYSICAL  IMPAIRMENT 
ANALYSIS 
A major point of contention between Morriss and BNSF was the 
impact of the ADAAA on the analysis of obesity as impairment, and thus 
the relevance of pre-ADAAA case law.66  The court sided with BNSF, 
finding that since the ADAAA did not alter the definition of impairment, 
“pre-ADAAA case law holding that obesity qualifies as a physical 
impairment only if it results from an underlying physiological disorder or 
condition remains relevant and persuasive.”67  As the court explained, 
Congress’ goal in enacting the ADAAA was to ensure the definition of 
disability be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals.68  
Specifically, the ADAAA abrogated specific Supreme Court rulings that 
Congress believed too narrowly interpreted the requirement that an 
impairment “substantially limit a major life activity.”69  Through the 
ADAAA, Congress instructed the EEOC to revise the definitions of 
“substantially limits” and “major life activity” to create a less demanding 
standard for disability.70  Congress, however, “did not express any 
disagreement with judicial interpretations of the term ‘physical 
impairment,’” which it presumably would have done if it intended to 
 
60.  See BNSF Ry. Co. 365 Mont. at 367; Res. for Human Dev., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 694. 
61.  Morriss, 817 F.3d at 1109-10. 
62.  463 F.3d 436, 443 (6th Cir. 2006). 
63.  129 F.3d 281, 287 (2d Cir. 1997). 
64.  Morriss, 817 F.3d at 1109. 
65.  See, e.g., Wagner’s Pharmacy, Inc. v. Pennington, No. 2013-SC-000541, 2015 WL 
2266374, at *8 (Ky. Sept. 24, 2015) (unpublished per curiam); Ivey v. District of Columbia, 949 
A.2d 607, 612-13 (D.C. 2008); Merker v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Fla., 485 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1353 
(S.D. Fla. 2007); Marsh v. Sunoco, Inc., No. 06-CV-2856, 2006 WL 3589053, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 
Dec. 6, 2006). 
66.  Compare Brief for Appellant, supra note 58, at *25-33, with Brief for Appellee at 42-51, 
Morriss v. BNSF Ry. Co., 817 F.3d 1104 (8th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-3858), 2015 WL 2379169, at 
*42-51. 
67.  Morriss, 817 F.3d at 1111. 
68.  Id. at 1110. 
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. 
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abrogate the interpretations from Watkins Motor Lines and Francis.71  
Therefore, the Eighth Circuit assumed Congress did not disagree with the 
courts’ interpretation in those cases.72 
Ultimately, the court determined that the ADAAA’s general policy 
statement encouraging broad coverage could not trump the plain language 
of the statute requiring obesity have a physiological cause.73  While 
Congress may have expressed its intent for a less rigorous standard of 
determining whether an impairment “substantially limits a major life 
activity,” the court maintained that an individual must first establish that he 
has a qualifying impairment before this less rigorous standard could be 
applied.74 
Pursuant to this interpretation, the court rejected Morriss’ contention 
that his obesity was a per se physical impairment because it was labeled 
“severe,” “morbid,” and “Class III.”75  Here, the court emphasized it was 
not enough for Morriss to establish his weight was outside the realm of 
“normal deviations” and thus so “extreme” as to constitute an impairment; 
rather, he needed to provide evidence that his individual case of morbid 
obesity was the cause of a physiological disorder.76  Morriss failed to do 
this. 
C.  THE ADA DOES NOT PROHIBIT DISCRIMINATION BASED ON  THE 
PERCEPTION THAT A CURRENT PHYSICAL  CHARACTERISTIC 
COULD LEAD TO A FUTURE PHYSICAL  IMPAIRMENT 
Finally, the court considered Morriss’ argument on appeal: that BNSF 
had discriminated against him under the ADA’s regarded-as prong because 
it perceived him as having a physical impairment he did not have.77  The 
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision in favor of BNSF.78  
The crux of Morriss’ regarded-as claim was that BNSF refused to hire him 
because it believed his obesity placed him at an unacceptably high risk of 
 
71.  Id. at 1111 (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978)) (noting that “Congress is 
presumed to be aware of [a] . . . judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation 
when it re-enacts a statute without change.”). 
72.  Id. 
73.  Morriss, 817 F.3d at 1112. 
74.  Id. 
75.  Id. 
76.  Id. (rejecting as contradictory to the plain language of the statute § 902.2(c)(5) of the 
EEOC’s Compliance Manual, which states that “body weight more than 100% over the norm,” 
i.e., “severe obesity,” is an impairment.).  In any event, the court found that Morriss’ weight was 
not “more than 100% over the norm.”  Id. 
77.  Id. at 1113. 
78.  Id. 
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developing certain medical conditions in the future, and that the company, 
therefore, regarded him as having a current physical impairment.79  After 
all, the email BNSF sent to Morriss rescinding his conditional employment 
offer stated that Morriss was “[n]ot currently qualified . . . due to significant 
health and safety risks associated with Class 3 obesity.”80  Morriss 
considered this email to be clear evidence that BNSF perceived his obesity 
not as a mere physical characteristic, but as a physiological disorder that 
affected one or more body systems, i.e., a physical impairment.81 
The court found Morriss’ argument unpersuasive.82  It determined that 
BNSF refused to hire Morriss “not because of any then current health risk” 
but because the company “believed by having a BMI of 40, [Morriss] 
would or could develop such health risks in the future.”83  According to the 
court’s interpretation, while the ADA prohibited an employer from 
discriminating against an individual on the basis of a presently existing 
physical impairment, it did not prohibit an employer from discriminating 
based on its assessment that a currently unimpaired individual had an 
unacceptable risk of developing a physical impairment in the future.84  The 
court found particularly persuasive the plain language of the EEOC’s 
interpretive guidance stating “the definition [of impairment] . . . does not 
include characteristic predisposition to illness or disease.”85  Because 
Morriss failed to provide any evidence that he suffered from diabetes, or 
any other physical impairment, at the time of his conditional offer of 
employment, BNSF’s decision was based solely on Morriss’ predisposition 
to future medical conditions, and was, therefore, not discriminatory under 
the ADA.86 
IV. IMPACT OF DECISION 
As American society becomes increasingly heavier, employment 
discrimination against overweight and obese individuals is likely to keep 
pace.87  Approximately thirty-one percent of adults in North Dakota are 
 
79.  Morriss, 817 F.3d at 1113. 
80.  Id. at 1106. 
81.  See Brief for Appellant, supra note 58, at *33-44. 
82.  Morriss, 817 F.3d at 1113. 
83.  Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
84.  Id. 
85.  Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app.). 
86.  Id. at 1113. 
87.  Obesity rates in the United States have more than doubled over the past thirty-five years, 
and currently approximately one-third of the American adult population is obese. Obesity Rates & 
Trends Overview, THE STATE OF OBESITY (Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.stateofobesity.org/ 
obesity-rates-trends-overview. 
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obese, making the state the seventeenth most obese in the country.88  
Accordingly, it is fair to assume that weight-based employment 
discrimination exists in North Dakota.  The decision in Morriss v. BNSF, 
provides some practical tips for legal practitioners that may be looking to 
bring a claim of weight-based employment discrimination under the ADA, 
as well as for employers who wish to avoid liability when developing 
weight or BMI requirements for specific positions. 
A.   BRINGING A WEIGHT-BASED EMPLOYMENT  DISCRIMINATION 
CLAIM UNDER THE ADA 
The Morriss decision continued a trend in the ADA/obesity caselaw 
requiring individual plaintiffs prove their obesity is the result of a 
physiological disorder or condition, and not the result of voluntary 
behavior, even in regarded-as cases.89  This can be very difficult to do, as 
most obese individuals do not know the cause of their obesity,90 and many 
scientists agree the causes are complicated91 and involve “more than simply 
eating too much and moving too little.”92 
Regardless of the challenge, it is critical for a plaintiff to bring 
evidence establishing that his or her obesity has some physiological cause, 
whether it be an identified medical disorder, such as an underactive thyroid 
(hypothyroidism), Cushing’s syndrome, polycystic ovarian syndrome 
(PCOS), or a generalized dysfunction of the metabolic system.93  Doing so 
will require expert testimony from the plaintiff’s physician or a physician 
with expertise in obesity.  In one case where the plaintiff, a morbidly obese 
health care worker, successfully survived summary judgment, her expert 
physician testified that the plaintiff’s “morbid obesity is a physiological 
disorder involving a dysfunction of both the metabolic system and the 
 
88.  Adult Obesity in the United States, THE STATE OF OBESITY (Aug. 17, 2016), 
http://stateofobesity.org/adult-obesity. 
89.  Korn, supra note 41, at 233. 
90.  Id. 
91.  See, e.g., Christine L. Kuss, Absolving a Deadly Sin: A Medical and Legal Argument for 
Including Obesity As a Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 12 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 563, 570-79 (1996) (discussing medical evidence pointing to several factors, 
including genetic, endocrine, metabolic, neurologic, psychological, and social, that contribute to 
obesity). 
92.  Henry, supra note 43, at 1762 (citing Cecile Bouchardeau, Siobban Nolan & Ann 
Reynolds, Medical Mystery: Morbid Obesity, ABC NEWS (Jan. 17, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/ 
Health/story?id=2799700&page=1). 
93.  What Causes Overweight and Obesity, NATIONAL HEART, LUNG, AND BLOOD 
INSTITUTE (Aug. 19, 2016), http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/topics/obe/causes. 
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neurological appetite-suppressing signal system.”94  Both the plaintiff’s and 
the defendant’s experts also agreed that heredity¾“a genetic or familial 
disposition”¾was a cause of morbid obesity, and that the metabolic 
dysfunction was incurable even when a morbidly obese individual loses 
weight.95  These types of factors may help a plaintiff establish a 
physiological cause for his or her morbid obesity. 
In addition to providing expert testimony on the physiological cause of 
one’s obesity, a plaintiff bringing a cause of action under the actual 
disability prong of the ADA must produce evidence that he actually 
suffered from a disability.96  This provides a conundrum for a plaintiff like 
Morriss, who attempted to show his obesity was a physical impairment at 
the same time that he “unequivocally denied suffering from any medical 
impairment or condition on BNSF’s medical questionnaire, had described 
his health as ‘good,’ and had disclosed no difficulties or limitations in his 
daily activities.”97  While a discussion of the requirement that a disability 
under the ADA “substantially limits a major life activity” is beyond the 
scope of this Case Comment, it is sufficient to be aware that someone 
alleging an impairment cannot simultaneously claim the impairment does 
not limit him or her in any way. 
B.   AVOIDING LIABILITY IN EMPLOYMENT 
Another practical tip gleaned from the decision in Morriss is how to 
avoid liability when developing and implementing human resources 
policies that implicate an individual’s weight or BMI.  The Morriss court 
interpreted the ADA as not prohibiting an employer from discriminating 
against an applicant or employee based on weight or BMI, so long as the 
basis for the decision is risk of a future impairment, not the existence of a 
present one.98  Therefore, so long as an employer provides evidence that its 
policy—such as BNSF’s maximum allowable BMI for “safety-sensitive” 
positions—is based on risks associated with impairments that may result 
from morbid obesity, such as excessive daytime sleepiness (associated with 
sleep apnea), heart attack, stroke, or some other form of sudden 
incapacitation (associated with atherosclerosis), or osteoarthritis of the knee 
or severe ankle injury (associated with body mass), and not the morbid 
 
94.  Cook v. R.I. Dept. of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 
1993). 
95.  Brief for Appellee at 5-7, Cook v. R.I. Dept. of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hosps., 
10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993) (No. 93-1093), 1993 WL 13622642. 
96.  Morriss, 817 F.3d. at 1106. 
97.  Id. 
98.  Id. at 1113. 
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obesity itself,99 a court following Morriss is likely to consider the policy 
ADA-compliant.  Reliance on the medical literature or the expert advice of 
a physician is advised so that these policies are neither under-inclusive (and 
thus, do not achieve the stated safety goal), nor over-inclusive (by 
discriminating against qualified individuals who are not at an unacceptable 
risk for dangerous medical complications).  Finally, in the event an 
employer becomes the target of a weight-based discrimination claim under 
the ADA, a documented medical basis for the policy becomes 
indispensable. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Morriss v. BNSF Ry. Co., the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that, in order for an individual’s morbid obesity to qualify as an 
impairment, and thus a disability, under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”), it must be the result of a physiological disorder or condition.100  
The court also held that an employer may discriminate against a morbidly 
obese individual so long as the discrimination is based on an unacceptable 
risk of a future impairment, not the existence of a current one.101  The 
decision will require anyone bringing a claim of weight-based employment 
discrimination under the ADA to provide expert medical testimony that his 
or her morbid obesity is due to a condition such as hypothyroidism, 
polycystic ovarian syndrome, or a metabolic disorder, while also allowing 
employers to avoid liability by carefully drafting the language of human 
resources policies placing limits on weight or BMI for safety purposes.102  
Overall, the decision is a continuation of ADA/obesity circuit court 
caselaw.103 
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